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INTRODUCTION

Water issues are often contentious. How much water can one
individual use? What must the water quality of water returned from use
be? How much water must be allocated to uses such as maintaining
sufficient instream flows for aquatic species? For the last century, the
United States has largely such answered questions through command and
control regulatory schemes rather than through markets and common law
dispute resolution processes. The choice of regulation by institutions
over other mechanisms has meant a reliance on centralized decisionmaking and a rejection of both the market's more decentralized

institutions and the common law.
Recently, water market proposals have become a significant part of

the debate over how to resolve competing claims on water. In addition to
the United States, active water markets are present in Chile and
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Australia.' Spain, France, and Great Britain are also considering marketoriented water policies.2
Water markets create incentives for conservation by offering water
rights holders the potential to sell the water they conserve. Markets also
facilitate reallocation of water to alternative uses. Many fear, however,
that water markets will harm environmental quality and some countries
have incorporated restrictions on market transfers with the purpose of
protecting the environment.' Such restrictions hamper the development
of markets by increasing the cost of trading thereby limiting the potential
to improve the efficiency of water allocation or encourage conservation.
In this Article we propose a set of principles to guide policy makers
as they consider water law reform measures. In Part II, we describe a set
of principles for water law reform. In Part III, we evaluate existing
institutions based on these principles. Part IV concludes the Paper with
an agenda for reform.
II.

PRINCIPLES FOR WATER LAW REFORM

Why choose one institution over another? Examining the structure
of institutions requires having a standard against which to measure the
institutions' advantages and disadvantages.
Choosing institutions
therefore requires both understanding the institutions and being willing
to make choices among competing values where those values conflict. In
this Section we set out ten principles for water law reform for use in
4
evaluating alternative institutions for water.
There are (at least) three reasons to begin with a clear statement of
principles. First, all institutional solutions (except, perhaps, very silly
ones) rest on some set of principles. Making those explicit is merely
recognizing that the principles exists.
Second, debating explicit
principles subjects proposals to an internal consistency check. If
consistency is lacking, then either the principles need to be reformulated
or the proposal changed. Third, putting the principles on the table allows
a more informed debate about reform proposals.
Our ten principles are: (1) optimize information requirements,
(2) facilitate use of local knowledge, (3) encourage experimentation,
(4) avoid waste, (5) recognize existing explicit and implicit property
1. Clay Landry,Environmental Water Markets in the United States (unpublished paper,
on file with authors).
2.
Id
3.
Id
4.
Other principles are, of course, possible. A society that values tradition, for example,
would likely have a principle that urged continuity with past practices.
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rights claims, (6) allow competing values, (7) get the incentives right,
(8) do what works, (9) require liability for violation of others' property
rights, and (10) protect and enhance individual freedom. We discuss
each below.
Principle1: Optimize informationrequirements
Information is costly to acquire and to process. All else equal,
therefore, a solution that requires more information is more costly than
one that requires less. A water pollution control system that relies on
individual permits for discharges, as does the Clean Water Act National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program,5 for
example, requires the central decision maker to have information about
the relative costs and benefits of discharge permits in order to optimally
set discharge requirements.' To set permits that rationally determine the
disposal capacity of the water, the decision maker must know about the
total loadings of various pollutants in the water body in various locations,
the water body's ability to eliminate pollutants, and the impact of the
pollutants on the ecosystems involved. To set permits that fairly allocate
the burden of pollution prevention, the decision maker must know about
the various sources of pollution,' including the costs of remediation

5.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1994).
6.
Id. § 1342(a). The NPDES does not explicitly require benefit/cost information. The
statute and regulation are about discharge control, not maximizing benefits. Moreover, there was
nothing in current practice, until Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDL), that gave an inkling of
EPA's loading concerns. Our point is merely that to optimally set discharge permit requirements a
decision maker would need to have this information.
7.
40 C.YR. § 122.21 (2001). Permit applicants must provide extensive information in
their permit applications. As an example, consider Illinois' requirements, under which applicants
must provide information
on the amount and nature of the proposed wastewater discharge: number of gallons per
day; strengths of sanitary wastes, industrial wastes, or cooling water; whether any toxic
pollutants or other materials that would interfere with the operation of the treatment
plant are present; the receiving body of water; and whether any of the wastes have been
pretreated. The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (JEPA) may also require the
submission of a plan and specifications for treatment works and summaries of design
criteria. ILL. ADNN. CODE tit. 35 § 309.103(a). The permit applicant may also be
required to perform toxicity testing as part of the NPDES permit application process.
35 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35 § 309.103(a)(3) (1996).
See Susan M. Franzetti, WaterPollutionin ENvIONMENTAL LAW IN ILLINOIS 9-9 (Jeffrey C. Fort
et al. eds., 2001).
S. See Michael P Healy, Sti1 DirtyAfter Twenty-Five Years. Water Quality Standard
Enforcement and the Availabiity of Citzen Suits, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 393, 449-50 (1997)
(discussing fairness issues in enforcement ofwater quality standards and the relationship between
sources).
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measures,9 impacts on other media of shifting pollution from one to
another,'" and alternative uses for the facilities." In contrast, a program
that charged sources based on the amounts of their discharges would
need to know less about the technical problems with reducing discharge
because it would set the price and let dischargers make appropriate
tradeoffs between control expenditures and discharge fees.'2
The important consideration here is what are the costs of centralized
versus decentralized information collection and what are the costs and
benefits to the decision maker of collecting the appropriate quantity and
quality of information. Centralized collection requires experts who may
have general information, but will not have knowledge of the special
circumstances of time and place. Decentralization may sacrifice some of
the expert knowledge, but take advantage of the special circumstances.
Moreover, decentralization forces the decision maker to consider the
benefits and costs of information collection, while centralization
encourages the decision maker to collect more and more information to
avoid mistakes that may get him or her in trouble.

9.
See Richard B. Stewart, A New Genemtion ofEnvironmentalRegulaon. 29 CAP.U.
L. REv. 21, 109 (2001) (stating that "most cost savings [under the CAAA] have come from
internal trades within utilities and from the flexibility which the program has afforded utilities to
reduce emissions in the most cost-effective way"). Remediation costs may vary widely among
sources. Allowing the shifting of such costs to lower cost remediators is one of the rationales
behind emissions trading schemes, such as that created by the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 for SO, emissions. Seeid. at 109.
10. See Peter J. Fontaine, EPA Multime&a EnforcementSrategy: The Stuggle to Close
the Environmental ComplianceCircle, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31,56(1993). As the disposal of
waste into water becomes more expensive, for example, firms are likely to shift to disposing
waste in landfills or by incineration. Some commentators have noted that this suggests that a
multimedia approach is superior to EPA's current media-by-media approach. See id. at 96-97
(stating that "permit systems are currently structured along single-media lines. Large regulated
facilities may have [various] ...permits, each of which contains limits on the amounts of
pollution that can be released into individual media. For example, a facility might have a CWA
NPDES permit that controls the amount of pollution it can legally discharge into the surface
waters, a RCRA Part B treatment, storage and disposal permit that requires the proper
management and disposal of hazardous waste, and a CAA PSD ("Prevention of Significant
Deterioration") permit that limits the amount of certain air pollutants the facility can emit if it is
located in an attainment area for the particular pollutants").
II. Molly Elizabeth Hall, PollutionHavens? A Look atEnvironmentalPermittinginthe
UnitedStates and Germany,7 Wis. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 29 (2000) ("Certainly, one requirement of any
environmental permitting system is that the system be fair. This means that guidelines are clear,
that officials apply the law consistently, and that there are no 'sweetheart deals."').
12. See Stewart,supranote 9, at 109 (noting that most savings under SO trading program
stem from utilities' ability to use measures "including fuel switching, the use of low sulfur or
washed coal, energy conservation measures, and development in 'scrubbers' alternatives that
would not have been feasible under 'one size fits all' [technology] controls").

2002]

PR1NCIPLESFOR WATER

339

Principle2: Facilitateuse oflocalknowledge
One of the most powerful insights in law and economics is found in
a 1945 article written by Nobel Laureate Friedrich A. Hayek. 3 In this
seminal piece, Hayek explores the question of what is the basic economic
problem and offers an answer.'4 In his view, the problem is not, given all
the relevant information, how to find the most efficient and effective
solution to the provision of some valuable good, such as improved water
quality.' That task, Hayek reminds us, is already worked out." It is just a
matter of applying logic to the facts at hand." The real problem, he
suggests, is how to get all the relevant information, since it is highly
dispersed.'" He describes the situation this way:
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is
determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of
which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form,
but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory
knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic
problem of a society is ... a problem of the utilization of knowledge

[which is] not given to anyone in its totality.'
Few goods that humans value collectively and individually could be
more complex than the water quality and quantity available in streams,
rivers, and lakes. Imagine a water planner who tries to solve the problem
of determining the appropriate level of water quality and quantity for one
major river, doing so for a diverse population of people and water users
along the river. Just determining the technical characteristics of water
biology, climatic conditions, and riparian land use for one major body of
water is a high-cost task. After all, technical knowledge is constantly
changing, and major breakthroughs often occur in the heat of task. If it is
possible for the task to be any more challenging, coming up with an
optimal solution becomes even more daunting when the planner has to
identify and include the social and economic dimensions of the problem.
Hayek's point is compelling. If it is truly impossible for a single
mind to solve this problem for one major river, it is ludicrous to think that

13.
(1945).
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. ECON. REv. 519
Id
Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id at519-20.
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a few individuals could resolve just the data problem for all rivers, lakes,
and streams in the United States.
But how can local knowledge be tapped? How can major elements
of the problem be decentralized?
Decentralized approaches for managing rivers and streams
dominate the developed world."0 The management of rivers in Germany,
by river basin associations, is decentralized, with some of the
associations dating back to the nineteenth century.2 ' Interestingly, the
associations compete for economic development, which is to say that
different water quality standards are set and different prices are charged
water users.' Through time, water quality has improved markedly, and
communities that rely on the water determine water use and prices.'
Local knowledge is thus brought to bear on these important water use
decisions.
A somewhat similar approach is found in France, where, since
1969, every major river has been managed by local and regional river
basin associations, with the composition of managing commissions
specified by the national government." In each case, members of the
river-using community define water management goals, and, as might be
expected, the goals vary across rivers and river segments.' To make
matters even more interesting, or challenging, the national government
provides no funds to the associations-they raise their own revenues by
imposing fees for discharge and withdrawal of water. 6 As self-funded
enterprises, the associations are sensitive to the cost of managing the
rivers and are also aware of competition from other associations." After
all, people and industry can "vote with their feet' if fees are raised too
high or water quality deteriorates.
Even the United States, with its current system of top-down,
command-and-control regulation, allows for some modicum of variation

20. ALLEN V KNEESE & BLAIR T. BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOICS,
TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS 258-62 (Henry Jarrett et al. eds., 1968).
21. Id
22. Id at 261-62.
23. Id at 259-62.
24. David W, Riggs & Bruce Yandle, Environmental Quality BiologicalEnvelopes, and
River Basin Markets for Water Quality, in WATER MARKEIG-THE NEXT GENERATION 147
(Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997).
25. See Hayek, supra note 13, at 521 (questioning the efficiency of decentralized
planning as compared to centralized planning).
26. Riggs &Yandle, supa note 24, at 153-54.
27. Id
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among the states. 21 While the federal government defines and requires
the application of technologies for discharge control, the states can set
water quality standards, and these vary across the country. 9 In this way,
local knowledge of streams, populations, and the diverse interests of
people become folded into a highly centralized management system.
As Hayek implies, no one can predict how problems of water
quality and use will be resolved when decentralized management
provides incentives for individuals to solve the management problem."
For example, along the Ruhr River in Germany, the managing association
has found that the level of dissolved oxygen in the river can be increased
in several ways. An obvious way is to limit the discharge of oxygenusing wastes. 2 Another way is to place large boulders in the stream so
that water turbulence will bring increased aeration.3 A third approach
involves the direct introduction of oxygen into the water.' The managers
of the associations discovered these approaches when, with limited
budgets, they realized that the rivers were theirs to manage and improve.
Use of local knowledge allows institutions to vary with local conditions.
This brings us to our third principle.
Principle3: Encourageexperiments thatbuild on localknowledge
If we lived in the world posited by most economic models, there
would be no difference in conditions from one place to another.6 In the
real world, however, local conditions, and our knowledge of them, matter
a great deal. The Cuyahoga River is not the Gallatin River and
Cleveland, Ohio is not Bozeman, Montana. People who live near one
river know more about it than they do about the other rivers, and people
who live in one place know more about it than they do about the other
places. As a result it is quite likely that people in Bozeman will make
different choices about how the Gallatin River should be treated than
people in Cleveland would make about the Cuyahoga. They will do so
both because their values may differ and because their information may
suggest different actions are appropriate. Few people would suggest
28.

Karol Ceplo & Bruce Yandle, Western States and Environmental Federalism, in

ENVIRONmEiNTAL FEDERALISM 225 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997).

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 226.
SeeHayek, supranote 13, at 521.
See KNEESE & BOWER, supranote 20, at 241-42.
See id. at 252.
See id. at3S.
See id. at 6.
See id at 238.
SeeHayek, supmnote 13, at 520-21.
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having the Cuyahoga managed by people from Gallatin County, and vice
versa. Avoiding "one-size-fits-all" solutions is therefore important.
Prior to the 1972 passage of the first federal water quality statutes,
the management of water quantity and quality were matters to be
resolved by communities, states, and regions. No two states handled
water problems in identical ways." Every state, however, had a body of
water law that addressed water quality and quantity. 9 In addition, each
state's water law rested on a common law foundation that applied
common law rules for protecting environmental property rights, and, of
course, each state's common law was unique."
Generally speaking, states and regions with greater water scarcity
had more elaborate water regulations, and a more highly developed body
of common law." Where economic development and population growth
were most advanced, systems of stream classification were used, with the
water quality parameters determined partly by local conditions." For
example, Massachusetts established a river classification system in 1887,
with some streams classified as industrial and others as recreational.
The latter rivers were maintained as trout streams." People in the various
communities participated in determining river classifications and after
doing so, resisted making changes in the system.4 ' The Merrimack,
Blackstone, and Neponset rivers were classified as industrial streams,
which meant that they would be specialized in transporting waste. 6
These rivers were not to be used for the drinking water supply nor
recreational use. Other nearby rivers served those purposes.4 It was not
until the federal government offered to fund the cleanup of rivers, with

37. Ceplo &Yandle, supm note 28, at 225.
38. Id
39. Id at 227-43 (reviewing waters laws in selected states before and after the 1970 Clear
Water Act).
40. Id at 227. We recognize that Louisiana with its code law is thought to be an
exception to this statement. However, Louisiana's use of its code comes very close to common
law. Id at 234-37. Roger E. Meiners, Elements of PropertyRights: The Common Law
Altemave, in LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990s-PRPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION 277-73 (Bruce Yandle
ed., 1995); Ceplo & Yandle, supra note 28, at 243-44. See generally ELIZABETH BRUBAKER,
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEFENCE OFNATURE (1995).

41.
SeegenemllyCeplo &Yandle, supranote 28, at 227-43.
42. Id
43. BRUCE YANDLE, THE POLrrlCAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 51-52
(Bruce Yandle ed., 1989).
44. Id at 51.
45. Id at 51-52.
46. Id at 51.
47. Id
48. See id
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no apparent cost to local citizens, that the people supported a move to
end the classification system.49
In some states, such as California, water quality was set in
decentralized regions where local citizens set the standards."° In other
states, Louisiana, for example, water quality was determined by means of
local water boards who were subject to private law suits if property rights
were not adequately protected." The idea of having one standard for all
bodies of water in a state, enforced with command-and-control regulation
specifying uniform technologies was unheard of. The protection of
environmental assets afforded by common law was an important
component of the state systems."2
When not constrained by statute, a common law regime yield water
quality outcomes that vary across locations. 3 A review of the record tells
us that public and private nuisance suits are brought when individuals
and communities feel inclined to show that they are damaged by the
action of a polluter.,' Arguably, the disposition to sue and the decisions
of common law judges are conditioned by the customs and traditions of
local communities. In this way, there can be "different strokes for
different folks."
Principle4: A void waste
In an old joke, an economist refuses to pick up a $100 bill lying on
the sidewalk in front of him, arguing that if such a bill was there,
someone would have already picked it up. In the real world, however,
there is wealth to be had all around us in the form of unrecognized
opportunities. When individuals discover such opportunities, they often
can "pick up" the wealth through entrepreneurial activity. Institutions
that block entrepreneurs prevent the creation of such wealth and waste it.
All else being equal, such institutions should be avoided.
Waste generally rears its ugly head where a transfer of resources is
not permitted. An example of this is a water right that requires a
specific quantity of water to be used in agriculture. This type of
regulation overlooks the opportunities to transfer water to more highly
valued uses, including urban consumption and in-stream flow
49. Id
50. Ceplo &Yandle, supm note 28, at 230-31.
51. Id at 234-37.
52. Id at 227.
53. Id at 242-43.
54. Id. at 243-44.
55. BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND CO!IION LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 50-56
(Terry L. Anderson ed., 1997).
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preservation to enhance
fisheries, which could ultimately enhance
6
environmental quality.'
Avoiding waste requires more than permitting specified activities,
however. As noted earlier in the discussion of Principles 1 and 2,
limitations posed by the centralization of knowledge means that existing
opportunities remain unknown to central authorities. Maximizing the
freedom of entrepreneurial individuals with local knowledge is thus
critical to minimizing waste. Ensuring that such knowledge is
considered is part of the rationale for our next principle.
One approach for improving the likelihood that waste will be
avoided is found in cases in which communities have had the
responsibility of solving their own water quality problems.5 ' The case of
Vermilion County, Illinois, illustrates the point." In 1996, the quality of
the community drinking water was questioned in a major news media
story. 9 Taking charge of the problem, community leaders formed an
environmental working group and determined that they would find a way
to reduce the flow of sediments and chemicals that were polluting the
North Fork Vermillon River.' They set about achieving their task by first
defining the biological envelope that contained the problem.6 ' With a
120,000 acre watershed circumscribed, they began testing various
discharge points, hoping to find the culprit. '2 Unfortunately there was no
single major culprit.6 Runoff from streets and other nonpoint sources of
discharge were as much to blame as point sources.'
Instead of demanding that command-and-control technology-based
controls be placed on all point source dischargers, which would have
been very costly and of questionable effectiveness, the group decided to
pursue passive controls. They called on community clubs, civic groups,
farmers, and garden clubs to plant seeds in an attempt to form permanent
filter and buffer strips near the banks of the threatened river.6 In one
year, 200 acres of filter strips were planted and 300 acres were planned
for the year ahead.6' Drawing on creativity and local spirit, the
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id at 56.
Id at 58.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
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community group is achieving a water quality goal at a minimal cost
when compared to the expense of installing advanced treatment
machinery."
Sometimes, it takes more to solve a water quality problem than can
be generated by the volunteer actions of garden clubs and farmers.
Consider a typical water quality management problem. The activities of
multiple waste dischargers, whether they are farmers fertilizing their
fields, industrial plants, or operators of sewage treatment plants,
determine the quality of water in receiving rivers and lakes. If it is
cheaper for one of the users to clean up the same waste than another, then
it is possible to save some resources such as reducing waste by allowing
the discharger with high treatment costs to clean up less and by having
the cheaper source clean up more. But how can knowledge of such cost
savings opportunities be discovered? And how can two dischargers be
encouraged to cooperate by minimizing their combined costs?
These questions were answered in an incident centered in North
Carolina's Tar-Pamlico river basin, a region in the eastern part of the state
that adjoins the Pamlico Sound and the Atlantic ocean.69 In the mid1980s, the people in the 4300 square mile region faced a severe
problem." Fish were dying in the Tar and Pamlico rivers and in the
Pamlico Sound. ' Nutrient discharge and runoff were the problems, but
every regulated discharger was operating within the limits of the EPAissued permits. 2 No one was breaking the law, but the rivers were dying.
Faced with an almost impossible problem, it was obvious that
something had to be done. Indeed, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency informed the community that unless community leaders found
another approach, the agency would require all dischargers to install
advanced technologies with an estimated cost of $50 to $100 million.73
And it was doubtful that even these would make much difference. Most
of the problem, it seemed, originated with farmers and nonpoint sources
of nitrate and phosphate runoff.'
After the completion of some background studies, community
leaders learned that the farmers' cost of reducing a unit of nitrate

68.
69.
70.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 58-59; Riggs &Yandle, supranote 24, at 154.
Id
YANDLE, supranote 55, at 58-59.
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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discharge averaged $67 to $119 per pound.76 Likewise, sewage treatment
plants were faced with an average cost of $860 to $7,261 per pound of
sewage sludge, to decrease nutrient discharge concentrations." The
potential for eliminating wasted resources while simultaneously saving
the river were huge. But how could the farmers and the managers of the
treatment works come together and cooperate?
The community leaders gained EPA approval to form the TarPamlico River Basin Association, which is made up of point-source
dischargers, such as the local sewage treatment plant operators in the
region." The association charges a fee for discharging nitrates and
phosphates which is assessed according to the concentration level of
discharges." The revenues collected are used to provide assistance to
farmers in changing their farming practices."0 Farmers are reducing the
flow of nutrients into creeks which then flow into the affected rivers, and
the point-source operators, in some cases, are expanding their
discharge.'
Taken together, all water quality users have cut back
significantly, and the river is healthy again."
It is estimated that what might have cost $50 to $100 million cost
less than $12 million." Waste was avoided by defining and enforcing the
right to trade discharge cleaning services among the water quality users.
The gains from the trade were large.
Pinciple5: Recogmize existing explicit and implicitproperty aights
claims
One important economic justification for property rights is that the
holders of these rights have an incentive to learn about the costs and
benefits of their actions with respect to their property.' Such learning
can occur through a study of the property or from market signals." Thus
a property owner may conduct extensive research into how a particular
76. Bruce Yandle, Communiy Markets to Control Agricultual Nonpoint Source
Pollution,in TAKING THE ENVRONMENT SERIOUSLY 193 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds.,
1993).
77. Id.
78. YANDLE, supranote 55, at 59.
79. Id.
80. Id.at 59-60.
81.
Id.
82. Id. at 60.
83. Id.
84. Bruce Yandle & Andrew Morriss, The Technologies of PropertyRights: Choice
Among Alternaive Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 135-39
(2001).
85. Id at 139-41.
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property can be used most effectively or she may receive an offer to
purchase the property from someone else in the marketplace. In either
case, the owner learns about the alternative uses of her property and can
evaluate her actions in light of the information.
Despite the lack of clarity in the specification of property rights to
water under current institutions, whether in the eastern riparian states or
the western prior appropriation states, many rights holders view
themselves as holding legitimate rights. 6 The political success of
reforms will often depend on whether the new institutions recognize
those preexisting claims, despite their lack of legal status. 7 For example,
when then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher privatized public housing
in Britain during the 1980s, she gave the current residents of the housing
the opportunity to purchase their home at below market rates."8 This
converted opponents of the plan into supporters."
New institutions will often not be able to recognize the full extent of
claims asserted by holders of implicit rights, particularly where the total
of such rights claims exceed the resources to be allocated." A failure to
provide some measure of recognition, however, will galvanize opponents
to change.
In addition to practical political considerations, providing
recognition to implicit rights claims is useful because it puts those rights
86. Id.at 153-58.
87. Id. at 167-68.
88. Raymond J. Friel, Blair Third Way-ThatcherF EnduringLegacy,48 U KAN. L. REV.,
861, 873-74 (2000).
89. Id. at 874-75. The Thatcher program is described by Professor Raymond Friel as
follows:
Thatcher purported to break this particular log-jam [tenant opposition] to pay through
another program of privatisation: selling off council houses to the sitting tenants. To
make this more palatable to the occupiers of such housing, the standard privatisation
mechanism was used: sale at undervalue, giving the tenant an automatic profit. Thus,
the sales of these houses were made not at the commercial value, but at a value which
took into account the length of time the tenant had occupied the property and the
diminished value of the property if it were to be sold with a sitting tenant. People could
thus become owners of their council houses for about thirty to forty percent of the
property's true value on the open market. Most people grabbed this opportunity. But
many failed to realise there was a sting in the tail. In order to finance the reduced
purchase price, people had to obtain mortgages from financial institutions. Most could,
and many in fact did, borrow far more than the purchase price because they now had an
asset of far greater value upon which to secure a loan. A good deal of this borrowed
money was invested in further privatisations in the search of more profit. Thus, the
ending of socialised housing was bought through sale at knock-down value, but much
of the additional money went back to the state through the process of privatisation of
commercial companies.
Id.at 874.
90. See id. at 873-75.
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into the hands of those with local knowledge about the resource in
question, facilitating implementation of Principle 2. Those who use a
river, for example, will know more about the river than those who do not.
Principle6 Allow expression ofcompeting values
Environmental policy debates are often conducted in black and
white terms. For example, political candidates are labeled "proenvironment" or "anti-environment" in a framework where economic
growth and environmental values are seen as competing values.91 Such
characterizations oversimplify the policy choices in several ways. First,
they suggest that there is a single value labeled "the environment?' In
fact, environmental systems are complex, dynamic systems and actions
beneficial to one set of species are often detrimental to another.
Reintroduction of an animal predator into an ecosystem, for example,
may benefit the predator species but may be harmful to plant species that
flourish due to heavy grazing by the prey species in the area.
Second, such characterizations suggest that we know what is the
"natural" state of the world and implicitly refers to a world without
humans. Damming a river is natural when beavers do it, but not when
humans do it.92
How individuals value different aspects of nature varies with
philosophy, religion, recreational preferences, and a host of other factors.
One man's views of salmon fighting their way upstream and whales
swimming in the ocean as symbols of the glory of the power of nature is
another woman's views of potential dinners to be speared and tribal
fishing rights to be asserted?
Rather than define a single state of the world as the "natural
environment," water institutions should offer space for multiple
conceptions of "nature" and "the environment?' As discussed above with
respect to Principle 3, diversity in environmental approaches is preferable
to a single value system because of the possibility of error and the
imperfection of human knowledge. In addition, allowing the expression
of diverse values fosters individual freedom, as discussed below with
respect to Principle 10. Finally, diversity in environmental approaches
91.
See, e.g., CARLA RAVAIOLI, EcoNOMISTs AND THE ENViRONMENT 58 (1995) (quoting
Herman Daly that "[t]he equilibrium of our planet's ecosystem is threatened by unlimited growth,
which means it is threatened by our very economic system").
92. There are, of course, often tremendous differences between human dams and beaver
dams-but there are also many cases (small scale hydro dams) where a human dam is closer to a
beaver dam in many respects than to, say, the Aswan Dam.
93. See generally ROBERT SuLLVAN, A WHALE HUNT (2000) (describing conflicts
between environmentalists and the Makah tribe over the tribe's resumption of whale hunting).
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recognizes the diversity of motivations and values people hold, allowing
them to concentrate resources on their priorities. There is thus room for
individual entrepreneurs to act on issues of concern to them. Given the
importance of private conservation efforts to key environmental policies,
such as species preservation and river conservation, a diverse approach is
critical to improving environmental quality.4
Principle7- Get the incentives right
Enforcement of rules is costly. Institutions that create or reinforce
incentives, such as those adopted by the Tar-Pamlico River Basin
Association, rather than ask individuals to behave against their interests,
are more likely to be successful at a lower cost." For example, if a river
has been treated as a free resource with respect to waste disposal, simply
forbidding waste disposal in the river is likely to cause some individuals
to invest in evading the rules rather than complying with the prohibition.
Unless the enforcing authority is willing to sufficiently invest in
monitoring and prosecution to make the expected cost of a violation
exceed the cost of compliance, the institution will fail to produce
adequate compliance.
Incentives can be used in many ways. For example, the citizen suit
provisions of the Clean Water Act provide an incentive for
nongovernmental organizations to monitor and enforce NPDES
permits.96 Similarly, the common law rights available to British
fishermen allow private associations to sue polluters for damaging fish
stocks. The story behind Pride of Derby & Derbyshire Angling v
Bitish-CelaneseLtd is a case in point."
The common law British action came when a fishing club, Pride of
Derby, and its association, Derbyshire Angling, brought suit against a
city, a chemical company, and a government-owned electricity plant for
damaging the fish in the River Derwent." As is true throughout the
United Kingdom, and in parts of Canada, angling clubs own the rights to
94. Roger E. Meiners et al., Burning Rivers, Common Law, andInstitutionalChoice for
Water Quaity,h TiH COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 54 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P
Morriss eds., 2000) (describing role of private institutions prior to Clean Water Act).
See supm notes and text accompanying notes 69-83.
95.
96. Clean WaterAct, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994).
97. See also Roger Bate, ProtectingEnglish and Welsh Rivers: The Role of theAnglers'
ConservationAssociation,hTHE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONENT, supm note 94, at 86, 9293.
98. [1953] ch. 149; see alsoBate, supm note 97, at 94-95; YANDLE, supranote 55, at 10708.
99. YANDLE, supranote 55, at 107.
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fisheries.' ° They have a cause of action against any person who harms
their property."l ' In this case, heated water was being discharged into the
river, as well as untreated sewage and industrial waste.' The interaction
of the waste made it difficult to determine which of the polluters was
most harmful. 3 But the common law court did not care.'"' The plaintiff
asked for injunctive relief, preying that all three parties be ordered to
cease and desist from harming the fishery.' 5
The court ruled for the plaintiff, as is almost always the case in the
panoply of angling club cases.' 6 On appeal by the defendants, the
Chancery Court upheld the injunction.' As a result, water quality in the
Derwent improved for all parties, including the anglers; the incentives of
the polluters were changed; and the rights of the anglers were made
08
secure.
It is standard fare for individuals, business firms, communities, and
other organizations in making decisions to want to minimize costs. If the
cost of consuming environmental quality is imposed directly on the
decision maker, normal incentives to deflect costs and seek benefits can
generate a desired result.
Consider the case of Shaeffer International and a massive effort to
clean the Chesapeake Bay." The story begins in 1983, when governors
of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, and leaders of the District of
Columbia petitioned the U.S. EPA to form a commission for preserving
the Bay."0 The problem was a familiar one: too much phosphorous and
nitrate runoff."' Over the next seventeen years, some progress was made
toward achieving a forty percent reduction in runoff, but not enough."'
Moreover, the search for meaningful solutions plagued the water quality
planners. Eventually, Shaeffer International entered the picture with the
Shaeffer system, a passive system designed to treat and process the
disposal that polluters located along the Shenandoah River were
100. Id.
101. Id
102. Id
103. Id.
104. Id
105. Id
106. Id at 107-08.
107. Id at 107.
108. Id
109. Bishop Grewell & Clay Landry, The Ecological Agrarian (unpublished manuscript, on
file with authors).
110. Id
111. Id
112. Id
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discharging such as that from poultry plants, communities, and food
processing plants, which discharge directly into the Potomac, and thence
to the Bay."3 Shaeffer offered to treat all the waste from the major
discharger, eliminate odor, and do it for less than the cost associated with
EPA-approved technologies." 4
Shaeffer has discovered a way to make money by treating the
combined wastes of multiple dischargers.'" The Shaeffer system takes in
waste, treats it biologically, and then releases clean water to be used as
irrigation for farmers' fields."16 The Shaeffer system is now in place."1 7
Nitrogen discharge from Shaeffer customers has been reduced fifty-four
percent and phosphorous loads reduced forty-seven percent."' Farmers
receiving Shaeffer-produced irrigation water, at no charge, are sprayirrigating fields of com, soybeans, and hay.1 Indeed, for the system to
work, Shaeffer must have the cooperation of farmers to dispose of the
process water.'
Incentives matter and so we should pay attention to them. This
leads us to our next principle: we must focus on what works rather than
on what symbolizes our desires.
Principle8.Do what works
Broadly speaking, institutions have impacts along two axes. First,
an institution can create incentives to enhance or detract from an
environmental feature.' Offering farmers payments to leave no-plough
buffer zones along waterbodies, for example, will lead to less runoff of
potentially damaging substances from farmers' fields.'" On the other
hand, offering farmers incentives to intensively cultivate fixed quantities
of land, as many agricultural price support programs do, will lead to
more potentially environmentally harmful practices such as intensive

113. Id
114. Id
115. Id.
116. Id
117. Id
118. Id
119. Id
120. Id
121. Jan Lewandrowski & Kevin Ingram, Policy Considerations for Increasing
CompatibiliiesBetween Agricultureand Wildlife, 39 NAT. REs. J. 229, 258 (1999) (describing
how Conservation Reserve Program provides incentives for buffer strips and other environmental
management measures).
122. Id at 258-59.
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fertilizer and pesticide use.' 3 Second, an institution can stand as a
symbol of a commitment to a particular set of environmental values.'24
Not drilling for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, for example, is
a potent symbol of national commitment to "protecting the
environment,' regardless of the actual environmental impact of allowing
oil drilling.'" Similarly, restoring the wolf to Yellowstone National Park
has enormous symbolic value as a sign of commitment to preserving
"wilderness"'-just as earlier efforts to eradicate
predators like wolves
127
served as symbols of "civilizing" the West.
When an institution both creates positive incentives for enhancing
environmental attributes and symbolizes important environmental values,
it is worthwhile.
When an institution symbolizes important
environmental values but creates incentives to degrade environmental
attributes, however, we must choose between symbolic politics and
reality. The Endangered Species Act, for example, creates incentives for
landowners to destroy habitat that might harbor endangered species

123. John 1E. Bliese, ConservativePrinciplesandEnvironmentalPoicies,7 KAN. J.L. &
PUn. POZY 1, 35 (1998):
For many years, agricultural price supports made it "profitable" for farmers to drain
critical wetlands and plant marginal and highly erodible land, using massive amounts of
chemicals, to grow crops no one needed. Without those subsidies, we would probably
not have a crisis of wetland loss, we would not have lost so much soil to erosion, and
we would not have many of our current problems with agri-chemicals polluting streams
and ground water.
124. See, e.g., Jo Sandin, PreservingArcticRefuge Deemed Worth the Fgh4 MmWAuKEE
J. & SENTINEL, May 29, 2001, at 2A, availableat2001 WL 9358883.
125. Compare Marego Athans, A Fierce Fight for Alaskas Riches Batteground,BALT.
SUN, May 6, 2001, at IA (quoting Dale DuFour, facilities manager at the Kaveolook School in
Kaktovik, Alaska, as saying, "This [Sen.] Kerry fellow in Massachusetts, saying we're going to
protect the wildlife refuge," he said. 'It's like me telling people in Massachusetts that they can't
cut their grass."); see also Sandin, supra note 124, at 2A. Sandin quotes Wilderness Society
Alaska Regional Director Allen Smith, saying that
[t]he arctic refuge has become the symbol of protecting our wilderness values, and it's
become a symbol of what many of us feel is wrong with our society's preoccupation with
occupying every square foot and developing every square acre. I think the real value of the
arctic refuge is not just in how incredibly wild a place it is itself-and every time I've been
there I learn something new-but I think its value is that here is a place that is largely as it
was created, very undisturbed, and that has an intrinsic value, a real biological value, to the
Earth because we cannot 'save ourselves' if we occupy all of it and destroy all of it.
126. Jennifer Li, The Wolves May Have Won the Battle, but Not the Wart How the West
Was Won Under the Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Plan, 30 ENVTL. L. 677, 685
(2000) (describing that wolves became seen "as a symbol of the "freedom and independence" of
the wilderness").
127. HANK FISCHER, WoLFWARS 10-23 (1995) (describing eradication campaign).
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because maintaining it reduces the value of the property.'28 This principle
makes the explicit choice for reality over symbol. If institutions do not
work, they should be abandoned. If institutions work, they should be left
alone rather than sacrificed to the demands of symbolic politics.
Even under the most carefully designed institutions, sometimes
individual actions cause harm. How to handle those situations is the
subject of our next principle.
Principle9 Require liabilityfor violation of others'propertyrghts
Thus, when one person harms another in every day life, the person
who causes the harm is liable for the damages suffered by the person he
harmed. Ordinary principles of tort, property, and contract law create the
liabilities that prevent most such harms from occurring and ensure that
compensation is paid for those that do occur. The incentives created by
requiring those that do harm pay for the injury they cause are critical to
the functioning of society. If it is to successfully function, the
mechanisms of water law must recognize equivalent principles.
When one person holds a property right to some attribute of water
and another person harms that attribute, the former must be entitled to
compensation from the latter. In many cases, an application of a
preexisting principle of tort, property or contract law provides an
adequate remedy for harmful conduct. Indeed, that is precisely what has
been done in Britain to address water quality problems that affect fishing
rights.'
The holders of fishing rights have banded together to sue
polluters and have received remedial injunctive relief.'30 United States
courts have experience with some aspects of this principle-someone
who misappropriates water rightfully belonging to another in the West,
for example, is quickly dealt with by the courts' 3 -but not as much as
they might, since statutory regulatory schemes have preempted the
development of the common law in this area.' 2
There are limits to the application of this principle. Compensation
is due for harm, but only for actual harm. To receive compensation,
injured parties must be able to prove in court that they have been harmed
128. See Andrew P. Morriss & Richard L. Stroup, QuarteringSpecies: The 'iving
Constitution,"theThirdAmrendmen4 andthe EndangeredSpeciesAc4 30 ENVTL.L. 769,794-98
(2000).
129. SeeBate, supranote98 at 93.
130. Id at 97-98.
13 1. Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons fom the Development of Western Water Law for
Emerging WaterMarkets: Common Law vs. CentralPlanning,80 OR. L. REv. 861, 895 (2001).
132. See Meiners et al., supra note 94, at 39 (describing how statutory protections for
polluters prevented common law actions).
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by conduct of the alleged injurer in a court of law. In addition, the harm
must be an actual harm to the rights held by the plaintiff. Grief over an
alleged injury to an aquatic species in a river thousands of miles away is
insufficient to provide standing. The harm must be significant enough to
warrant the effort to seek compensation.
Requiring compensation for inflicted harm limits the actions of
members of society to only acting in ways that do not harm others. This
brings us to our final principle, protect and enhance individual freedom.
Principle10: Protectand enhance individualfreedom
This is perhaps the most controversial of our ten principles. For
some, humans have no more rights than other species to the use of water
or other resources. "3 We believe, however, that institutions that fail to
recognize the centrality of human needs will fail to win acceptance from
the most important audience: humanity. We therefore unapologetically
place human needs at the center of our proposed principles and
individual freedom at the center of human needs.
Application of this principle requires simply that, when two sets of
institutions are being compared, we should prefer the set that provides for
more individual freedom. Thus if water conservation is an important
goal and water can be conserved through an authoritarian regime or a
regime that relies on voluntary behavior and incentives, the latter is to be
preferred.
Sunm2ary
We have set out ten principles for use in evaluating water law
reform proposals. These ten principles provide a framework for
comparison; they do not dictate a result. No solution is likely to score
high on all ten measures and so tradeoffs must be made. Making those
tradeoffs within the context of an open debate about underlying
principles will, however, provide a means for informed decisions. We
133. See, e.g., Susan Emmenegger & Axel Tschentscher, Taking Nature.' Rights
Seriously: The Long Way to Biocentism in EnvironmentalLaw, 6 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.
545, 592 (1994). The authors advocate:
Nature's rights in a biocentric perspective can be assigned a specific content and a
balancing procedure to accommodate competing interests between humans and other
living entities of nature. Further practical implications of taking nature's rights
seriously include organizing legal and political representation of nature, correcting
damage assessment under a "marketplace of interests" perspective, and developing
supportive action plans to compensate for the historical disadvantage nature has
suffered in terms of the protection of its interests.
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now turn to brief evaluations of existing water law institutions in the
context of these principles.
I.

WATER LAW INSTITUTIONS

In this Section we discuss three important attributes of U.S. water
law institutions: (1) the substantive rules governing water, (2) the means
of allocating rights, (3) the type of decision making mechanism, and
(4) the location of the decision.
SubstantiveRules
There are three major sets of substantive rules governing water
rights in the United States. Eastern states largely follow the riparian
doctrine, whereas western (and more arid) states generally follow the
prior appropriation doctrine. More recently, federal environmental laws
have also become a significant factor in water rights.
As developed in Britain and applied in the United States, the
riparian doctrine has three key features: (1) ownership of land on the
banks of a body of water created the water right," ' (2) all landowners
held equal water rights,"' and (3) landowners' use of the water must be
"reasonable ' ' 6 The rules of nineteenth century riparian doctrine were
relatively vague, e.g., "reasonable use," and left a great deal to case-bycase decision-making. Thus riparian common law left a great deal to
both the judge and the jury in any given case.
Although substantively different, the law of prior appropriation that
grew up in the western states had many similarities to eastern water law.
The common law of prior appropriation presented relatively clear cut
factual issues to juries. Its differences from riparian common law largely
clarified rather than complicated factual issues. 1"' For example, the
concept of the seniority of rights provided an important innovation: "A
sharp-edged rule, ranking the quality of rights' titles by their dates of
issue ...prevents disputes and reduces bargaining costs drastically by
134. Anthony Scott & Georgina Coustalin, The Evolution of WaterPghts,35 NAT. RES. J.
821,825 (1995).
135. Id. at 825; see alsoJOSEPH R. LONG, A TREATISE ONTHE LAW OF IRRIGATION § 9, at 19
(1902).
136. LONG, supranote 135, § 9, at 19.
137. Scott & Coustalin, supa note 134, at 901. This is not to discount the substantive
differences. There were also important differences in legal rules. Riparian rights did not allow
one individual to claim an entire stream, while prior appropriation did. LONG, supm note 135,
§ 17, at 33. Prior appropriation also introduced "three features not found in the earlier common
law system: precedence by seniority; the requirement of beneficial use; and a locational
arrangement which was conducive to transferability." Scott & Coustalin, supra note 134, at 916.
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saying that the most senior user gets all his water before the next gets
any."3 The system of rules produced by the common law were thus an
effective institution built around private rights and markets to handle a
situation where water was far more scarce than in the more humid east.
As an institutional response, the development of common law of prior
appropriation economized on a scarce resource in the less populated
west-decision makers' time and energy.'39 Similarly, deciding only
actual disputes meant that no decisions were needed on the hypothetical
disputes necessary to make a complete, consistent allocation of all rights
to a particular body of water. As the west was troubled by an
unaccountable, and sometimes corrupt, territorial judiciary, this was an
important feature.
Increasingly, however, national environmental statutes are affecting
local water rights. Not only does the national government directly
regulate water through statutes like the Clean Water Act, but other
environmental regulatory regimes, such as the Endangered Species Act,
are affecting how water can be used.
Summary
The key focus on US. water law in the nineteenth century was that
it was common law, and the focus should not be on the differences
between prior appropriation and riparianism. The traditional emphasis
on differences in substance neglects the important similarities between
the common law of riparian rights and the common law of prior
appropriation. The most important of which was its adaptability where in
developing the prior appropriation doctrine out of riparianism,
nineteenth-century water users "were merely following a self-help
experimental approach in organizing their respective rights and
obligati6ns in a new land as best they could.""' Indeed, University of
Colorado Professor Charles E Wilkinson termed the early decisions
developing the prior appropriation doctrine "common-law judging at its
best. With no statutes to speak of, western courts looked where they
should have looked-to custom, to conditions in the field, and to
138. Scott & Coustalin, supranote 134, at 919. The introduction of seniority alone meant
that many disputes never needed to reach a court as lay individuals could determine their relative
rights by simply comparing priorities in many instances. It also significantly limited the potential
for bias by shifting decisions to clearer issues (e.g., priority, beneficial use) from muddier issues
(e.g., reasonableness of use). Id.
139. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, GrowingaLegalSystem in the Post-ComrnuistEconomies,
27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 9-13 (1994) (describing the need to conserve legal resources where
scarce).
140. Scott & Coustalin, supm note 134, at 910 (citations omitted).
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economic and social needs." 4 ' Both doctrines were simply common law
responses to different conditions.
In contrast, the modem development of both doctrines and of
modem environmental law has been largely a statutory process. Rather
than common law, large areas of water law today are administrative
processes built around frameworks of statutes and regulations derived not
from case-by-case decision making but from legislative and bureaucratic
processes.
Allocation Mechanisms
Water rights are allocated through two main types of institutions:
(1) administrative and (2) market.
AdministrativeAllocation
Administrative allocation of rights occurs when a state body grants
rights based on nonvoluntary transactions.'42 For example, if the owner of
a water right wishes to transfer that right to another individual, most
western states require that a state agency, usually the state engineer,
approve the transfer. 3 This approval is not based on a voluntary
transaction but instead on criteria defined by statutes and on political
considerations."
Administrative allocation mechanisms have, for our purposes, four
relevant characteristics. First, they require that the decision maker have
sufficient knowledge to apply the relevant criteria.' 5 Thus if the decision
maker is required to consider the impact of the transfer on pollution
levels in the body of water, the decision maker must know the pollution
levels before the transfer, how the transfer will affect the pollution levels,
and the alternative means of protecting water quality.
Second, administrative allocation mechanisms require that the
decision maker have sufficient knowledge of the criteria to be used to
evaluate the decision.' 6 Some of these criteria may be stated in a statute
or regulation, but others may be implicit.' 7 For example, a quote stated
141. Charles Wilkinson, Aldo Leopold and Western WaterLaw,24 LAND & WATER L. REv.
1,6-7 (1989).
142. Deborah Moore & Zach Willey, Water in the American West: InstitutionalEvolution
andEnvhionmentalRestoratlonin the2lst Century,62 U. COL. L. REv. 775, 822 (1991).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 822-23.
147. Id.
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such as, "don't interfere with the state senate president's favorite trout
stream," might be an important but unstated constraint on water transfers.
Third, the decision maker must be constrained to follow the
appropriate criteria and not follow an inappropriate one.' 8 In short, the
decision maker must implement the public interest, not his own private
interests.'49 Finally, there must be a mechanism for determining what the
appropriate criteria are.'50
Each of these characteristics raises important issues. First,
gathering knowledge is expensive. Second, preventing decision-makers
from departing from the public interest requires monitoring and
sanctions. Lastly, public decision-making has costs and raises publicchoice issues.
Markets
Markets are decentralized mechanisms for allocating rights.''
When an individual wishes to acquire rights held by another, she must
offer the rights holder sufficient compensation to acquire the rights
through a voluntary transfer. 2 By relying solely on individual voluntary
transfers, markets avoid the collective choice problems and need for
constraints on decision makers required in administrative allocations.' 3
The information requirements for markets are significantly lower
than for administrative allocations because markets are able to rely on
price signals.'
By conveying the alternative valuations of resources,
prices enable market actors to compare their present use of a resource to
the potential use others might make of it without knowing the details of
those potential uses.' 5
DisputeResolution
Disputes over water are handled through two main types of
institutions: (1) administrative and (2) common law.

148. Id at 822.
149. Id
150. Id
151. Barton H. Thompson, InstiutionalPerspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81
CAL. L. REv. 671, 701 (1993).
152. Id at 702-03.
153. Id at 703.
154. Id.at709-10.
155. Id at 710-14.
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AdministrativeDecision-making
As with initial allocation decisions, disputes can be handled
administratively' 56 Such procedures incorporate many of the same
problems of administrative methods arise from initial allocation.'57
Administrative dispute resolutions raise an important additional problem,
however. Such agencies have more specialized missions than generalist
courts. As a result, they are more susceptible to influence by special
interests.'55 Indeed, specialist bodies are often created "when some
interest group does not believe that equal application of the law by judges
applying the traditional canons of statutory interpretation and the
traditional values of the common law will result in decisions that favor its
own ideology and interests."'
Specialist institutions are more likely than generalist institutions to
be influenced because their specialized nature provides an incentive for
special interests to invest in lobbying efforts.'
Consider the case of a
judge in a court of general jurisdiction. Any particular type of case is
likely to make up only a fraction of the judge's docket.'6 ' Interest groups
concerned with particular types of cases will therefore be reluctant to
invest in the political process to ensure an advocate is placed in the
judgeship."' Now consider a state administrative agency focused on a
single issue, such as water rights. Special interests concerned with water
will have a much greater incentive to secure control of the agency, since
virtually all of the agency's actions will affect their interests.6
Common Law
Two major sets of water rights rules arose out of the common law.
The first, the riparian system, developed in England and in the eastern
United States.'" Although it was often carried west with other parts of
the common law,' the riparian system did not flourish in the more arid
156.
52(1991).
157.
158.
159.

Harold Bruff, SpecializedCourtsinAdnimustrat'veLaw,43 ADMIN. L. REv. 329,345Id
Id.at330-31.

BERNARD ROBERTSON, THE STATUS AND JURISDICTON OF THE NEW ZEALAND
ENPLOY1MENT COURT 15 (N.Z. Bus. ROUNDTABLE 1996).

160. Bruff, supra note 156, at 332.
161. Id.at331.
162. Id.
163. Id
164. SeeLux v. Haggin, 10 P. 671, 746-51 (Cal. 1886) (describing impact of 1850 statute
adopting common law and requiring riparian rights to be recognized).
165. Id

360

TULANE ENVIROAMENTAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 15

Western states and territories. Those states developed a second new
system of rules, the prior appropriation system, initially through
customary legal institutions 6 but eventually recognized by the common
law legal system as legitimate rules.'6' Western states adopted a variety
of pure and mixed appropriation systems.
In both cases, however, the common law system's rules defined
water rights, the means of acquiring and losing those rights, and the

means of resolving disputes among rights holders. Most of these rules
were not detailed "legalistic" rules (such as modem regulations) but
were, like rules in other common law areas, general principles.6 '
At common law, disputes were resolved through trials, usually
before a jury.' As a rule generating system, the common law had four
key features. First, rules developed primarily incrementally, adjusted
largely as the result of the discovery of relevant new facts rather than in
response to an outcry for change." Second, common law rules grew out
of custom."' Third, cases arose out of real disputes."2 Courts therefore
addressed only questions brought to them by litigants. Finally, the
common law was more than the content of legal rules. It was, as one
nineteenth century writer termed it, "a particular system of reason,"" 3
rather than a specific set of rules.
The above features of rule promulgation vis-A-vis the common law
method are important since they played a key role in the common law
water right's system. Water rights were defined incrementally in the
course of the resolution of actual disputes."4 These disputes would be
decided piecemeal in many instances, where not every potentially
relevant party appeared before the court in a given action."5 Finally, the

166. SeeNorman K. Johnson & Charles T. DuMars, A Survey ofthe Evoluton of Western
Water Law in Response to Changing Economic and PublicInterestDemands,29 NAT. RES. J.
347, 349 (1989) (listing Native American practices, Spanish and Mexican colonial practices,
Mormon practices, and miners' practices as sources for prior appropriation).
167. See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882) (stating that
appropriation rights existed prior to legislation).
168. Seeid.
169. See David Schoenbrod, Protectingthe Environmentin the Spiit ofthe CommonLaw,
inTHECOMMON LA AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 94, at 3, 18.
170. Seeid
171. Seeid.at 17.
172. Seeid at 18.
173. JOEL PREmTSS BISHOP, COMMON LAW AND CODIFICATION 3 (Chi., T.H. Flood & Co.
1888).
174. Roger E. Meiners et al., BurningRivers, Common Law,andInstitutonalChoice for
Water Quality,in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supranote 94, at 54, 70.
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process of resolving the dispute was case-specific and did not require
resorting to a more utilitarian analysis of the impact of rules." 6
The combination of these factors gave the common law several
important characteristics. First, common law decision-making was
extremely difficult for special interest groups to influence. Even if an
interest group wanted to "buy" a decision, the availability of juries
ensured that many decisions were entirely out of the hands of decision
makers who could "stay bought" for more than one case, reducing the
incentive to invest in buying decisions. Second, the common law's rules
were based on the practices of the community, a constraint that could not
be altered easily. Third, rules changed incrementally, making it harder to
bring about major reallocations of rights.
Location ofDecisions
Decisions about water rights are made at various levels of society.
Some decisions are made at the national level (e.g., by the federal
Environmental Protection Agency) and some are made at the state or
regional level (e.g., through state courts).
Jonathan Macey and Henry Butler have proposed a "Matching
Principle" to determine where the optimal location of decision making
authority is."' This principle "suggests that determining the efficient
level of regulatory authority within a federal system is not very
complicated. In general, regulatory authority should go to the political
jurisdiction that comes closest to matching the geographic area affected
by a particular externality" 78' Further, decentralizing authority, and so
allowing competition among regulatory authorities, is superior when four
conditions are fulfilled:
(1) the economic entities affected by the law must be able to move to
alternate jurisdictions at a relatively low cost; (2) all of the consequences of
a particular jurisdiction's laws must be felt within that jurisdiction;
(3) lawmakers must be forced to respond to adverse events (such as a
decrease in population or falling real estate prices, market share, or
revenue); and (4) jurisdictions must be able to select any set of laws they
desire." 9
Historically, these conditions were largely met with respect to
numerous aspects of water law. American water law began as state
176. SeeSchoenbrod, supmnote 169, at 18.
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property law, defining rights to water. Individuals were free to locate in
any state they wished and states were free to adopt any set of water laws
they chose.'"' Cross-border effects do exist in water between upstream
and downstream states, but such effects are present only in a limited
number of states (those on a particular river, for example) and so justify
regional, not national, intervention.
Over time, federal law began to play an increasing role, as the
federal government sponsored water projects in the west and, since the
1960s, through federal involvement in water pollution control programs.
Although many aspects of water law remain primarily state law
questions, federal law plays an increasingly important part.
IV

CONCLUSION

In the mid-nineteenth century, Americans in the new states and
territories of the West had a blank slate on which to write their water law.
They opted for a new substantive doctrine, prior appropriation, but the
time tested procedures of state-based common law won out. Over the
next century, these institutions were increasingly supplanted by
administrative procedures and national substantive law. If we were in the
position of those nineteenth century pioneers today, what choices should
we make?
In this Article we have presented ten principles we think could
guide such a choice. These principles point toward a water law system
built around private property rights, common law legal doctrines, and
individual court actions. They suggest a water law that incorporates local
knowledge through decentralized decisionmaking and limited
involvement of government. What would such a system of water law
produce? Because it would be the result of countless individual
decisions based on local knowledge we cannot possess or integrate, we
cannot describe the result in detail. We can, however, offer several
predictions:
* water would be conserved where it is scarce.
* water would be available for environmental purposes such as
maintaining instream flow.
* water shortages would be reduced or eliminated.
* disputes over water would be no different than other disputes
between individuals, rather than major political crises.
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These things would come about because markets would allow water to
flow to its most valued uses, disputes would be brought only when real
injuries existed, and markets would allow a diversity of water uses to
coexist.
Would all streams have enough water to support environmental
goals such as the restoration of salmon fisheries in the Pacific
Northwest? It is possible, although it would be unlikely that any single
value would monopolize a market-based process. But we think it likely
that more environmental goals would be met under such a system than
under present water law regimes because a market-based approach would
allow those who value such water uses to make them a reality.
Five years ago, one of us concluded a book on water markets as
follows:
Some would say that water cannot be entrusted to markets because it is a
necessity of life. To the contrary, because it is a necessity of life, it is so
precious that it must be entrusted to the discipline of markets that
encourage conservation and innovation. Unless distortions created by
governmental intervention are corrected, water shortages will become more
acute and crises will be inevitable. When this happens, it will be difficult
to suppress market forces. It would be better, however, if we could get
political and legal impediments out of the way of markets before necessity
becomes the mother of invention.182
These ideas remain true today.
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